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CHAPTER 23
A SECULAR CRITIQUE
OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS
AND P OTITICS
PAUL CLITEUR
Lrr us start with the statement that there are countless ways in which religious ethics and
religious politics can be criticized. As |ohn Shook writes: "the complaints are preffy much
the same: religious leaders caught as hypocrites, religious people behaving immorally; reli-
gious scripture endorsing unethical deeds; religions promoting hatred, conflict and wa¡s;
religions promoting injustice and discrimination; and the likd' (zoro: 3). But what I am con-
cerned with in this chapter is a specific secular critique of religious ethics and politics. An
example can make this clear. The religious ethics and politics of, for example, the fundamen-
talist Islamist movement IS or isil (Said eor+; Sansal zor4) can be criticized from another
religious perspective: a Christian or Buddhist one, for instance. One may also criticize reli-
gious ethics and politics from the view of the same religion, Islam, that IS adheres to. This
is, in fact, what the British Prime Minister David Cameron did. Reacting to the spectacular
military successes of IS, Cameron said: "What we are witnessirig is actually a battle between
Islam on the one hand and extremists who want to abuse Islam on the other" (zor+), His
remarks are relevant to our purpose because theyhighlight the difference between a critique
of religious ethics and politics in general and a secular critique of religious efliics and politics
in particular.
Not everyone would be willing to accept Camerort's characterization of the conflict. First
of all, IS would not. Who is the British prime minister to lecture them on what is true Islam
and "abuse of Islam"? What expertise does Cameron have in this field? From the perspective
of a reasonable outsider, Cameron's religious critique of religious ethics and politics of IS was
not very convincing either. Was iS, fighting for an Islamic caliphate (Pankhurst zot3), not an
Islamic movement? Did their ideas really have nothing to do with the religion of Islam?'Was
this'âbuse of Islam'?
Whatever can be said about Cameron's analysis, his remark is important because it sets
us on the track of the specific character of a secular critique of religious ethics and politics.
Camerods critique is a critique of the religious ethics and politics of IS, but it is defrnitely not
a secular critique. What Cameron does-and this type of critique is prevalent, much more
prevalent than a secular critique, in fact-is tell the extremists that they do not live up to the
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ideal form of religion byhijacking Islam and not realizing the true nature of Islam, which is
basically peaceful and good.
Cnrrrqun AND Sncur¿.n Cnrrreun
What makes a critique a secular critique? Secular critique is different, and it is the pur-
pose of this chapter to highligllt what makes a secular critique of religious ethics and
religious politics different. Secularists-those who engage in the secular critique of
religious ethics and politics-do not primarily object to this or that specific element
of religious ethics and politics, Religion is not particularly friendly to women (Benson
and Stangroom zoog), honlosexuals (Heins 1993; Fone zooo), and atheists (Werleman
zoog). Secularists m¿inly object'to the whole concept of religious ethics and politics and
deny any necessary connection between religion on the one hand and ethics and politics
on the other. Furthermore, secularists advocate the severing and emancipation of ethics
and politics from religion.
There are several misunderstandings about this enterprise, and it is useful to get them
out ofthe way first. Antisecularists, that is to say, those who do not sympathize with the idea
of secular ethics and politics, are often mistaken about the nature of secularism when they
claim that secularists have declared war on religion as such. Secularists are militantly against
religion, many people think. Or they are 'hggressively'' antireligious. But this is something
secularists deny (Blackford zotz Berlinerblau zotz). At least it is not connected to the
secularist position as such. There are secularists, like Richard Dawkins and Christopher
Hitchens,l who subscribe to both secularism and atheism. But that does not make the con-
nection between secularism and atheism a necessary one.
What all secularists do have in common is that they are against the use of religion for bol-
stering moral and political claims. They believe a moral claim has to be supported ethically
(moral secularism) and a political claim has to be supported politically (political secular-
ism). But one cannot advance religious reasons for a moral or political claim. At least one
ought to try not to do this. What secularists favor in discussing matters of public policy and
ethical matters is speaking a kind of "moral Esperanto": a language that is not connected to
religion and that, accordingly, we can all understand (Cliteur zoog).,
So what secularists object to is usíng religion for moral and political purposes. In other
words-and this is an important point to highlight-religion does not have to be rejected as
such (this is how atheism difers), but it certainly must be rejected when it presents itself as
the basis of ethics and politics. The word "basis" requires further commentary and analysis,
since it is a source of much confusion (Nowell-Smith rggg). Of course) it is possible that
someone is "inspired" by religious ideas. Christians claim to find inspiration for their poli-
tics in their religion. They claim, for instance, that the person of Jesus Christ inspires them to
advocate some sort of alleviation of the plight of the hungry and the poor. Many Christians
also declare that the idea that God created all men equal ('hll men are created equalj' it is
said in the Declaration of Independence) inspires them to advocate more social justice in
the legal and political system. One may, for example, be inspired to advocate the abolition of
slavery. This was the case with the English philanthropist and politician William Wilberforce
(tzSg-r8¡¡) who had a leading role in the abolition of the slave trade, Religious inspiration
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for necessary political change is also prevalent in the work of Martin Luther King ]r. (tgzg-
196g), whose work is was hailed as a 'testament to religious faith at its best" (Guiora zoog: 63;
Guiora zot4:8-9). Ralþing his audience against the Vietnam War, King spoke eloquently
about the "ministry of fesus Christ" and said: "to me, the relationship of this ministry to the
making of peace is so obvious that I sometimes marvel at those who ask me why I am speak-
ing against the wat" Gg6Z:65t). Muslims claim that the life of Mohammed is a source of
inspiration to them. For Buddhists, the life of Buddha is a point of reference for their moral
and political ideas (Revel and Ricard rggz). ]v\4rat this all means is that many religious believ-
ers assert that they derive their moral and political ideas from their religion, for example,
from HolyScriPture.
It is important to state clearly that none of this puts them at loggerheads with secularism
or secularists. Such a conflict only arises if religiously minded people (people "inspired by
religion') argue that morality and politics can be legitimate only on the basis of religion.In
other words, what secularists contest is not that some religious and political ideas a¡e derived
from religion (a historical or psychological connection), but they object to the idea that
one needs religion to justify these ideas (which is a moral and, more in particular, a meta-
ethical claim). Secularists deny that if there is no God, ever¡hing is permitted-a worry
once expressed by Dostoyevsky (Sartre tgTo;3í;Bouteligier zot4: zgo),In their view moral
choices in the world are very much the same with or without God. Here, the conflict with IS
or any other religious extremist or fundamentalist movements is evident.
There is a second crucial misunderstanding about a secular critique of religious ethics and
politics. This is that one presupposes that secularists must be against values like neighborþ
love or being kind to one another because these ideas are somehow connected to religion
or derived from Holy Scripture. What is wrong with these kind of values, religious people
may ask secularists. The answer is: nothing. This is not what the secularist critique is about.
The secularist critique only says that these values are not necessarily intertwined with, or
dependent on, any religious outlook. You can be good to your neighbor without trying to
base those values on your religion. From the perspective ofsecularism, "religion' as a reason
to act in a certain way is comparable to 'ãstrology" as a reason to act in a certain way. People
can sometimes perform good deeds on the basis of astrological predictions, but that does
not make astrology a "sound basisi' "indispensablei' or "necessary'' for politics or ethics. It is
better to separate religion from ethics and politics like it is better to separate astrology from
ethics and politics. l !
So much for being "inspired" byyour religion. From a psychological point of view it can-
not be denied that moral behavior is inspired by religion, but the significance of this empiri-
cal factto justiffmoral orpoliticalbehavior is nil. We can nextformulate this secular critique
of religious morals and politics by introducing a central philosophical concept, the concept
of "autonomyl'
Monar, AuroNoMy AND Moner, HsrnnoNoMY
The central idea of seculari smis øutonomy. Now as is so often the case with central concepts,
this word has many meanings, but in the context of secularism it means "independence."
it is the independence of ethics and politics from religion. Therefore, one may consider
tta
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secularism as an emancipation movement: it entails the emancipation of ethics and politics
from religion (consult Schneewind 1998).
As with all types of emancipation, this development does not necessarily mean that you
"hate" or are unduly "negative" about what you emancipate from. Let me give an example.
Women's emancipation does not mean that women have to "hate" men or are unduly critical
about men. It only means that they do not want to be subservient to men. Women have their
own place in society as agents independent from men. Another example is this. The eman-
cipation of slaves does not entail that slaves are unduly critical o(their masters. Their only
claim is: we are human beings with an innate human digntty.
Although these observations may sound like truisms, this is all highly relevant for secu-
larism. From a secular point of view, ethics, politics, and religion are not intrinsically con-
nected; they are separate domains of reality. The German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann
(r882-r95o), one of the most impressive defenders of an autonomous ethics, states it in
the following way: "F¡om the façt that religion and mythology have been bearers of posi-
tive morals, it does nét follow that morality absolutely needed these supporters. Rather can
their ethical content be entirely removed in principle from the mytho-religious drapery''
(zooz: rrr). Hartmann continues, "The religious man attributes to the divinity everything
of which he does not know the source; foremost, consequently, he attributes tlle moral com-
mandments to it. In so doing he fails to appreciate that autonomous character of the moral
values" (rn). What has to be accomplished is the recognition of the self-sufficing cha¡acter
of moral principles, says Hartmann. He clearly sees this as a process of emancipation: "Then
ethics discards the garments ofits infancy and calls to mind its own proper origin" (rrz), One
may confound these domains (and this is what has happened in most historical epochs and
in most places of the world), but one ought to separate them. This would be better for all of
us: believers, unbelievers, and everyone. Ofcourse, secularism is not a recipe for the good
life, but it is an element of it. We may formulate it thus: secularism is a necessary condition
for harmony in a pluralist society, not a sufficient condition.
The opposite of moral autonomy is moral heteronomy. Where moral autonomy tries to
disconnect morals from religion, moral heteronomy tries to connect the two, In its most
extreme form, moral heteronomy teaches that morality is totally dependent on religion.
A "moral obligation' is simply a "religious obligation." And tl¡e most extreme form of moral
heteronomy, the opposite of moral autonom¡ is a situation in which people are prepared to
do things that are evidently morally outrageous, but because of that relationship with reli-
gious mandates these acts are performed or condoned. The presumed necessary connection
between religion and morals makes people think that immoral acts are not immoral because
they are mandated by religion.
A good example of this is the killing of one's child on what is perceived as a command of
God. What is one of greatest goods that we have? Life. And what is one of the worst things
that can happen to us? Death. So killing an innocent human being3 counts as the most
serious ofFense one can commit against the common good. Now what is the greatest good
next to our own life? The life of those whom we love: our spouse, our parents, our children.
Accordingly, the most atrocious act someone can perform, is killing one's father (patricide),
mother (matricide), or one's child (infanticide). To the dismay and indignation of secularist
critics of religious ethics and politics (and in a sense a kind of conundrum for many religious
believers as well), this is what happened in the story of Abraham, who was willing to offer his
son Isaac when this was commanded byGod.
:
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The story is known as 'the binding of Isaac" or "the Akedah' (in Hebrew)' According to
tfr" ,tory, ÁUrut u* bound his son bãfor. placing him on the altar.4 The story is 
told in the
õld T,.rtu*"ot, or what the fews call the Hebrew Bible (Genesis zz:r-r3), and with minor
u',u,,o,,, also in the Qur'an (37:gg.l3),so this story is important for adherents of }udaism,
Cfrrir,t*Ury, and Islam (Dr d¡ iooZ) .The God of Israel entered into a covenarìt with Abraham
tc.""ru ;'gf), ^rrdso he became the patriarch of Israel (John 
g::¡,¡g; Romans 4:r), but he
is also seen as the spiritual father of Christians and Muslims (Romans 4:uf; Quran 33:78)'
lhe three Abrahaml faiths all acknowledge Abraham as their forefather' so it is not 
strange
that Bernard Lewis (zoo¡) writes that Judaism, christianiry and Islam have many points
in common. Islam is *olh.1or., to the ]ewish or Christian tradition than to' for example'
Hinduism (a form of polytheism)': Buddhism (according to some not even to be considered
as a religion), or Taoism.ó
God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son. The story is this. Abraham had to kill
his son as a test of his loyalty to God. Genesis says, "God tested Abraham" 
(Genesis zz:r)'
God said to Abraham: "Take your son, your on$ son Isaac, whom you love, and go to the
land of Moriah, and ofer himthere as a burnt ofering on one of the mountains that I shall
showyou'(Genesis zz3).Thisisahorriblecommandtoafatherofcourse,butsurprisingly'
Abraham did not protest. "He bound his son Isaac, and laid him on the altar, on top ofthe
wood" (Genesis zz:ro). But when Abraham took the knife to kill his son, God interfered in
the form of an angel. The angel said: "Do not lay your hand onthe boy or do anything to 
him;
for now I know that you fear"cod, since you have not withheld your son, your only son' 
from ? \
me" (Genesis zz:rz).
From a secularist perspective there are at least two problems with this story' First that
Abraham wa, pr.p*ãd to do something grossþ immoral, only because he thought this was
reiigiously mandated. That shows to what depths people can sink-if they do not separate
ethics from religion. But there is a second prãbl.* thut hut to be highlighted: it was God
who demanded this. The angel of the r,onp called to Abraham a second time from heaven
(Genesis zzt5) and said to Abraham:
By myself I have sworn, says the lonp: Because y:o 11]" done this' and,have not withheld
fáo, iot, yoot only son, I will indeed bless you' and I will make 
your oftsPring as numerous as
the stars ofheaven and as the sand that is on the seashore. Andyour ofspring shall 
possess the
gate of their en.**r, *aîyf"ur offspring shall all the nations of the earth gain blessing for
ãhemselves, becauseyou have obeyed myvoice' (Genesis zz:9) ' I
Inshort,GodrewardedAbrahamforsomethingthatwasagrossviolationofethics.
Abraham should have said: "Lord, you have endowed me with conscience' with moral sense'
and I understand you want to put me to the test now and see whether I will say 
'no to such an
immoral commandl' nrrJ tft. f*¿ should have said: "Yes, that's precisely what I mean' and
witll your refusal to sacrifice your son, youhave passed this test." B-ut this was not what hap-
pened, as we know ¡nd it is áso not what the classical tradition of Western theology teaches
us. St. Augustine understood quite well what the meaning of this passage was' As Augustine
wrote in öity of Gofl,explaining why Abraham had to be obedient: when the command 
was
given to ,u.rid." his son 'th. tlnurrá.t of a divine command must be obeyed without argu-
ment, (tg7z:6q+). And if one regards Holy Scripture as "divine command," that implies that
ffoty S..iptrre *urt the., Ue folãwed without argument' This attitsde was backed up with a
whole worldview derived from scripture, for exaáple, the conviction that the devil 
lnspired
t,\Í
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heretics to oppose Christian teaching "under cover of the Christian name as though their
presence i" itt. City of God could go unchallenged like the presence, in the city of confu-
sion, of philosophers with wholly different and even contradictory opinions!" (Augustine
1958: 4o9). Heretics were considered "enemies within" byAugustine (+ro)'
It is therefore not surprising that in the prevalence of Abraham in the holy tradition
atheists see a compelling argument to reject such a god altogether-that, at least, is what
Paul Kurtz (ryg}: +o-qù, Richard Dawkins (zoo6t 274-275), sam Harris (zoo5r r8), A' C.
Grayling (zor3), and christopher Hitchen s (zooz) have done. Even if Abraham is less obedi-
ent io Co¿b commands in other passages (e.g., Genesis t8tz33i),Genesis zz is a problem-
not only according to atheists but also according to moral secularists' AbrAham's willingness
to obey lmplles the total annihilation of moral autonomy. The prevalence of this mentality as
exemptifreã in this central part of the Bible is therefore an important element in the secular
critique of religious ethics andpolitics'
r, r
Por,rrrcAL AuToNoMY
AND POITTTCAL HETERONOMY
So far we have been concerned with the secular critique of religious ethics (ond not poli
tics). Ethics, from a secular perspective, should be independent of religion' And as the para-
digm of nonautonomous ethics we dealt with the story of Abraham, wil]ing to sacrifice his
.hild *h"r, commanded to do so by God. Abraham is therefore a kind of anti-hero of moral
secularism.
There is another dimension to secularism: political autonomy and the concomitant ideal
of political secularism. Not only should morality be independent from religion but also poli-
tics. And ¡ust like with moral secularism, there are countless manifestations of the opposite
of this ideal, to wit attempts to base the polity on adherence to one or several religions' The
Bible provides examples showing how the tension between political secularism and reli-
gious politics is an important element of the sacred tradition. As Bertrand Russell wrote,
ilr" u.ry.*ly history of the Israelites cannot be confirmed from any source outside the Old
Testament. For that reason, it is "impossible to know at what point it ceases to be purely leg-
endary" (tgqS: pg).Moving forward in time, it happens that the first person mentioned in
ttre Oi¿ Testament confirmed by an external independent record is at the same time highly
relevant for our topic: King Ahab, King of Israel who ruled from c. 874 BcE to c. 8l¡ scr' (He
is spoken of in an Assyrian letter dating 853 ncr)' Ahab was enmeshed in a protracted con-
Rici øth a religious spokesman, the piophet Elijah. Elijah plays the same role for political
secularism as Abraham played with regard to moral secularism, as avoice of denial'
Elijah promoted a firm monotheism that had to be defended against rival gods (Wrighl
,oop; fiir.h zoo4; Assman nzoo6).He claimed that there was no reality except the God of
Israel: no God but God (see Aslan zoo5). Despite his good reputation in the Old Testament
and the Qur'an (6:8ó), in contemporary terms we would regard Elijah as an extremely
"intolerant" religious leader, at leasl if we take "tolerance" to mean that we put up with reli-
gious creeds other than our own (consult Ayer 1988: 96;zagorin zoo3: xiii). Le his rejec-
iion of the foreign gods, Elijah did not mince words. As Leonard Levy writes in his study
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Blasphemy: Verbal Ofense agøinst the Søcred from Moses to SøIman Rushdie"'Inoffensive
"',"u.h *u, rot the hallmark òf Ehjah, Isaiah, or |esus 
hims elf" (tggl: SZz).
""ïtlu 
*ut the son of the Israeliie king omri, who was already allied with the Phoenician
cities of the coast. He had married lezebel (died c. 843 nce), the daughter of Ethbaal, king 
of
Twe and sidon (the modern Lebanon). lezebelplayed the role of the seductress' with her
;iil;ñ;ì,ra u hrg. contingent of pagan priests and prophets, she propagated a rival
,Jtrgron ro the religion ofisrael: thã t.[giån of nãat in the royal city of Samaria' During the
,.rgî orehuu there was thus not one religion in Israel but two. Baal was the chief god of the
Canaanites, He was worshipped as a god ãf rain who made the soil fertile; sometimes 
he was
ut* por*uy"d as a god of war. Throughout Israel temples were established to Baal on 
high
pf".Ë, *ft.t., ,incelhe days of the lu-dges-, h: yut worshipped' During the reign of Ahab'
'nuut worrnip became the åurt religion, which led to the confrontation with Elijah (Comay
Lgg5t 4).In a modern pluralist ,oá.ry this would be nothing special, but this was not the
lli tn' prophet Etijah saw the matter. Accepting both Baal ga vanr.v$ as objects of ven-
eration made the Israelites guiity of blasphemy, apostasy' and heresy' (These are the kind of
charges contemporaïy tslaåist id.otogu., makeãgainst the royal fuily of Saudi Atabia'7)
|ezeñel's policies, and Ahab's condoning of these policies, also caused a kind of syncretism' 
a
ilendinjof religions together, which is also something that orthodox believers abhor'
The Bible tell, ,r, thuinhiuh devised an experiment that was supposed to demonstrate the
existence of the one tru. Gåd, th. God of Israel, and also demonstrate the false claims of the
prophets ofBaal.
Let two bulls be given to us; let them choose one bull for themselves, cut it in pieces' and 
lay it
onthe wood, butput no fire to it; I will prepare the otherbull and layit on the wood' but put no
fire to it. Then yoo .ufãn *r. nu*e ofyou, god and I will call on the name of the lono; the god
who answers by ûre is indeed God' (r Kings zo:24)
Needless to say the god of israel wins. The god of the prophets of Baal remains silent and 
the
God of Israel iinites the pyre. On the basis of this success' Elijah also claims superiority over
Ahab (and his wife) *hå hud given the prophets of Baal some room to exercise their own
religion. What Elíjah wants is: ãne God, one religion, and oneting who is totally committed
to t[at religion (üle Abraham was when he was prepared to offer his son)'
The stor-y about the struggle between Ahab and Elijah for political leadership is important
for two reasons. The first iJihat this story manifests the spperiority Of the one true god' who
is the God of Israel and not Baal. This is, supposedly, proveú by the experiment on Mount
Carmel. From the perspective of a secular .iiilq,'t. of religious politics and ethics' the story
"f 
rtft"¡ ,àa fryun ir also important for another reason' What is established after the experi-
ment Ís that Elíjah, and not Ãhub, i, the supreme leader of the people of Israel' The moral of
the story seemi to b., "Listen to the prophet, to the religious leader, and not to the king' to
the secular leaderl' lt is ihe religious leaãer who has the direct line to God' not the secular
politicians,
This interpretation is of major political significance, as one may expect. It means a "theo-
cracy" is the right model of go1r;rr*"¡¡t and that the authority of a 
"priestl' "popel' "aya-
tollahi, or .,imam" supersedeã that of the secular leaders in the state. The struggle between
Ahab and Elijah was only the beginning of the struggle befween thereligious powers striv-
ing for supremacy *¿ ti. ,".o1-u, pouu-.tt. The story of Ahab can also be read against the
Uuîçrourra of a i.ritual humiliatioi' of the king, which was, according to some scholars,
t.
't
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afì important element in the royal ideology of fudah, Babylonia, and Assyria' This ritual
humiliation was meant to emphasize the "absolute dependence upon the favor of the deity"
(Rosenberg 1965: 38r). In its Babylonian form, the chief priest of the temple of Marduk, the
patron deity of the city of Babylon, would take the diadem, scepter, and the other royal insig-
nia from the king and lay them before the deity. "\Mhile divested of these signs ofloyalty' the
king had his ears boxed und pulled by the priest, after which he would kneel before the god
anJoff.r aprayü of penitence" (¡8r). Then the priest announced to the king that his prayer
had been heard. If the king looked after the welfare of Babylon and the temple, his power
would be exalted. subsequently, the royal insignia were restored to him.
As one might expect, this was not only a manifestation of the rightness of theocracy over
democrac¡ but it also meant a boost to tlle importance of the priests. It de facto meant the
rehgious leader was inaugurated in a position ofpower over the secular leader' From the
"ritual humiliation" of the king in Babylonian lore to the completely opposite republican
ritual humiliation of Pgpe Pius VII during the crowning of Napoleon I in r8o4, the struggle
between clerical leadeis and the secular leaders would be an ímportant element of political
history. (Napoleon crowned himself anddid not confer this important symbolical gesture to
the pope.)
To modern ears the story of what happened on Mount Carmel, which, according to the
believers, 'þroved" the supremacy of the God of Israel over Baal, may sound perplexingly
narve. In Spinoza's famous chapter VI on miracles of A Theologico-Politicøl Treatise,the phi-
losopherwrites:
As men are accustomed to call Divine the knowledge which transcends human understand-
ing, so also do they style Divine, or the work of God, an¡hing of which the cause is not gen-
.rãlly k ro*.r, for ihe'masses think that the power and providence of God are most clearly
displayed by events that are extraordin ary aná contrary to the conceptionthey have formed
of nutor", especially if such events bring them any profit or convenience they think that the
clearest possible proof of God's existence is afforded when nature, as they suppose, breaks
her accustomed ordec and consequently they believe that those who explain or endeavor to
understand phenomena or miracles through their natural causes are doing away with God
and His providence. ([16zo] r95r: 8l)
From a post-spinoza perspective, miracles prove nothing, at least not what people who per-
form or solicit miracles claim they prove (divine intervention)' Besides, is it not possible
that the god of Baal is superior in many respects etccept in his ability to perform miracles?
But this is not what should concern us here. Within the context of this chapter on the ten-
sion between religious ethics and politics on the one hand and secular ethics and politics on
tlre other, this story is about the clãsh between the rival claims of t}re king andthe prophet of^
Israel to have the final say on what the state religion should be. Who is the ultimate source of
authority: the king or the prophet? The secular ruler or what is called the spiritual ruler?
In a theocracy, ãs the religious leuder Elijah wants to demonstrate, this is the prophet. The
king can be corrected and punished by the religious leader.s It is also the religious leader who
is aithorized to inflict punlshments upon the people and a disobedient king. In another epi-
sode of this conflict Elilah says to King Ahab: "Because you have sold yourself to do what is
evil in the sight of the Lord, I will bring disaster on you" (r Kings zr:zo). The king couid have
said: "Who Jre you to lecture about the religion of this realm?" The king could also have said'
as Frederick the Great GZn-t286) did, that everyone in his kingdom could live accotding
t,
4
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to the religion ofhis own choice ("Jeder soll nach seiner Fasson selig werderl'). Every state-
mandated compulsion that Elijah wants to introduce in matters of religion is anathema to
the modern human rights perspective and also to political secularism.
A secula¡ critique of religious ethics and religious politics focuses on moral autonomy and
political autonomy. The defense of moral autonomy (or moral secularism) and the defense
of pollticat autonomy (or political secularism) can be illustrated by many stories from Holy
Sciipture, Two of these stories stand out: the story about Abraham's willingness to sacrifice
his son and the story of Elijah aiming to crush the prophets of a rival religion.
CoNcrusroN
This chapter highlights a specifically secular critique of religious ethics and religious poli-
tics. The secular critique takes as its starting point the ideaTof secularìsm. Secularism is an
ideal (or ideology) that comprises two elements: advocating moral autonamy and advocat-
ingpolitical autonomy. Autonomy has several meanings, but in the context of secularism it
means independence of religion. So moral autonomy means morality independent of reli-
gion. Political autonomy means politics independent of religion.
The aim of a secular critique of religious ethics and religious politics is to show that hav-
ing an autonomous ethics is better than departing from a heteronomous ethics. This point is
illustrated wifh the example of Abraham willing to sacrifice his son. It is also better to have an
autonomous politics than a heteronomous politics. That point is illustrated with the story of the
conflict between King Ahab and the prophet E$ah. Political heteronomy and moral heteron-
omy are important themes in the stories of the Bible. The edÍors of The New Oxford Annotøted
Bibte (CooganzooT) spell out the central core ofthe teaching of the books of Kings. It is "didac-
tic literaturei' and a repetitive theme is that the 'bnly God there is, the Lord, demands exclusive
worshipl'e Worship must not involve idols or images. The world ofthe books of Kings, the edi-
tors continue, is amoralworld, inwhichwrongdoingis punished, whetherthe sinnerbe king (r
Kings rr;9-r3), prophet (rKings4:7-25),or ordinarylsraelite (z KingsT:t7-zo)'
This world is totally different, one may add, from the moral lessons the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (rg+8) teaches with its provisions on freedom of thought
(Article r8), freedom of religion (Article r8), and freedom ,of speech (Article r9)' Articles
r8 states: "Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, consciénce and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance."
Norns
r. On Dawkins, paragraph 3 of chapter z, "secularism, the Founding Fathers and the Religion
of America," in The God Delusion (zoo6) is basically a defense of secularism and not of
atheism. Chapter 3, "drguments for God's Existencel' is a defense of atheism. Regarding
Hitchens, his use of the word'Secularisrn' seems broader than that of Dawkins in God Is
N ot Gre øt : How Religi on P o i s o n s Ev er y thing (zo oz : 12, 39, 5 5, 68 - 6 g ).
Í
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z.Falkenhaynet(2o14i53)referstothedebatebetweenRawlsandHabermasontheway
British Muslims *o,ríãiuu" to make their objections to the publication of Rushdie's 
The
SatanicVerses.Accor;díngtoRawls,religiousob¡ectionstothenovelhadtobetranslated
into a language that woid be acceptablã to all British citizens' But Habermas thinks 
that
many religious citizens would notie able to do this without jeopardizing their existence
as pious citizens. n figiou, citizens should not be forced to "secularize" their 
speech' But
does not Habermas underestimate the capacity of religious citizens, 
one may ask? Does he
not confuse religious citizens with religious fundamentalist citizens?
3. See Norman (i995: 
'ssl"'où' 
¡rnó'notá,nly a-humanbeing;see Singer (r99o)'
4. A classic .o^*"rrríi i, tci"rk"guurd's 'i Panegyric upon Abraham" 
(1994: rr-r8)' See
also Kretzmarrn (rqqgi,lvlleynek (rgg+)' and Sandmel (rq¡l)'
5. At least som, ør*, áíllinauism are pot¡heistic' There are 
also monotheistic elements in
the Bhagavad Gita. See Taliaferro (zoo9: 8)'
6.ConsultLewis(zoo3:4)andcoglparisonsofdifferentfundamentalistformsofJudaism,
Christianiry and Islám in Foureåt andVenner (zoo3)'
7. see pelham tro"o. rr"* trr" f errp"ctiv. of Islamist ideologues, 
such leaders are even sneak-
ier than the openly secularisiand atheist leaders of the United States 
and the former Soviet
Union' In their case, at least, we know what we have' In the case of liberal 
sycophant pseudo-
Muslims who present themselves as the representatives of Allah in this 
world' we are dealing
withdangerousfiguresbecausenotallseriousbelieversseethroughtheirfaçade.
g. A medieval case serves as ânother illustration. According to some historians, canossa,
the now-ruin"¿ t"nt¡-..nt*y castle southwest of Reggio nell'Emilia in ltaly, was famous
forservingasthemeetingplacein:¡;lTTofPopeGregoryVllandEmperorHenrylV.
The matter *u, u .o.r*ou".rry ou", who possessed the rightful power of investiture 
of
local church officials. On zS fanuary, Henry journeyed to canossa.as a simple penitent'
The pope *u¿. i,i* *.iif"î three days beiore Henry received absolution' The name
\ ¿ ;ð"tår|"" became associated with the submission of the secular power to the church'
'& 
*r;rr* ;;;;;;, based on solid historical facts is dísputed (Mccabe e3s z7)'
DuringPrussia,sKutturkømpfagainstRomanCatholicinfluencesinGerman¡Bismarck
promised, *Nu.¡ Cunárr" gËftå wir nicht" ("We are not going to Canossa") (see Bury
r93o: 163).
9'AsstatedbytheeditorsoftheNewoxfordAnnotatedBible(Cooganzooz:488)'
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